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1.   Introduction     
Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) has attracted much attention during the past quarter 
 century as the country has become one of the largest suppliers of FDI in the world.  Despite the 
difficulties encountered in the post-bubble adjustment of the past decade, the Japanese economy 
ranks second in the world in its output production, and also as the source country for cumulative 
in-bound FDI into the United States. 
Economists have focused on various aspects of Japan’s FDI, and there is now a large 
literature on this topic.1  Most of the empirical literature on Japanese FDI has used fairly 
aggregative industry-level or macro data.  In contrast, there have been relatively few studies that 
use company-level data, and those that do pertain to only a handful of manufacturing industries.  
The motivation of this study is to undertake a full-sample survey of all firms listed on all eight 
Japanese Stock Exchanges (Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya and five other minor local exchanges) over 
the period 1976-2000.  We carefully checked the data source discussed below to find if, and 
when, each company made the first FDI entry.  We then test the statistical link between the 
observed pattern of the initial FDI decisions and some of the financial and non-financial 
variables that have appeared in separate literature.   
Given the complexity and the diversity of issues and hypotheses that have been offered in the 
literature, our approach is an eclectic one that combines a number of explanatory variables, but 
focusing specifically on the initial FDI entries.  Our motivation is to focus on the initial decisions, 
rather than on the value of FDI as in most other studies that do not differentiate between the 
initial move and subsequent ones for further investment.  Once the commitment is made with the 
                                                 
1 See Caves (1993) for the literature survey and the reference citations.  The works that have appeared in 
  print since then that are relevant here include Pugel, Kragas and Kimura (1993), Trevino and Daniels  
  (1994), Azrak and Wynne (1995), Kojima (1995), Yamawaki (1995), Eaton and Tamura (1996), Kogut 
  and Chang (1996), Belderbos and Sleuvaegen (1996, 1998), Kumar (1998), and Barrell and Pain (1999). 
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initial entry, the well-known hysteresis effect takes hold that alters the incentives structure of 
FDI to at least some extent.2  We avoid that complication by excluding from our observations 
subsequent re-investment decisions. 
2.   Hypotheses   
We list below hypotheses to be examined in this study, along with  a brief justification and 
background for each.  In the statistical section that follows, the issue is whether, and to what 
extent the proffered explanations have relevance for the initial FDI decisions.     
(a) Research and Development 
     The technology asset possessed by a multinational firm plays a key role in the theory of FDI.  
The firm can overcome natural disadvantages in operating in a foreign country if it has an 
opportunity to capitalize on an internationally transportable intangible asset it owns.  From the 
internalization perspectives in the theory of multinational enterprise these intangible assets can 
be broad, encompassing goodwill, reputation and organizational skills in general that the firm 
essentially owns.  But in particular, technology as proxied by R&D expenditures has been found 
to be a significant determinant of Japanese (as well as Western countries) FDI in a number of 
empirical analyses that have been conducted.3  
(b) Exchange Rate 
     The link between exchange rates and FDI has been debated extensively.  On the theoretical 
grounds, if the international capital market is reasonably open and efficient, changes in the 
exchange rate may fail to impart a systematic cost-of-capital bias to either domestic or foreign 
investors, as the risk-adjusted expected returns tend to be equalized across investments 
                                                 
2 See Dixit (1989), Kulatilaka and Kogut (1996), and Kogut and Chang (1996). 
 
3 The more recent literature on R&D and Japan’s FDI includes Kogut and Chang (1991, 1996), Drakes 
  and Caves(1992), Trevino and Daniels (1994), Pugel, Kragas and Kimura (1996). 
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regardless of their national origin.  To the extent that the exchange rate impacts on the current 
account balance of payments, it does affect the capital account as a whole.  However, it leaves 
the composition of the capital account that includes FDI indeterminate.4      
 On the other hand, changes in the exchange rate impart a wealth bias on the value of 
foreign assets such that depreciation of the dollar, for example, allows Japanese firms to acquire 
dollar-denominated assets more cheaply than previously.5  This will result in a direct link 
between exchange rates and FDI from the cost-of-acquisition standpoint.  Indeed, empirical 
studies have generally supported the link between exchange rates and Japanese FDI.6   
(c) Liquidity 
     It is generally accepted that liquidity matters in investment decisions.7   It matters because 
firms face finance constraints that increase the costs of external finance relative to internal 
finance on account of asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders, or simply because 
of transaction costs involved in generating external finance.  Liquidity may also contain useful 
information regarding the future profitability of the firm, thus impacting on current investment 
decisions.  Whereas those links are well established on the theoretical grounds, the current 
controversy pertains to the measurement problem.  In particular, how does one capture the 
finance constraints of the firm?  Does the empirical relationship between cash flow and corporate 
investment adequately reflect the presence of the firm’s financial constraints?   The evidence is 
                                                 
4 This argument dates back to Mundell (1968). 
 
5 Froot and Stein (1991) argue that FDI is information-intensive in the sense of asymmetric information, 
  and that it is subject to different financing requirements than portfolio investment that may be readily 
  financed with external funds. 
 
6 See Caves (1989), Froot and Stein (1991), Drake and Caves (1992), and Kogut and Chang (1996). 
  However, exceptions are Ray (1988) and Healy and Palepu (1993). 
 
7 See Chirinko (1993) and Chirinko and Schaller (1995) for reference citations in this rapidly expanding 
  literature. 
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not clear, and there is an on-going controversy on this question.8  The issue that is relevant to this 
study, then, is whether there is an empirically meaningful relationship between the firm’s 
liquidity as represented by cash flow and its decision to invest abroad. 
(d) Business Groups       
     One of the most frequently mentioned “unique” aspects of Japan’s business system are the 
inter-firm relationships known as kigyo keiretsu.  Literally translatable as enterprise affiliation, it 
is a network of companies drawn typically from different industries and a primary bank as lender 
and leader of the group (horizontal keiretsu).  Alternatively, the network may be more narrowly 
focused in an industry (e.g., the auto industry), comprising subcontractors and the main 
contractor (vertical keiretsu).  The networking encourages cooperation through mutual cross-
shareholding among member companies, mutual assistance and information-sharing.9  
Presumably, it is easier to undertake FDI for the first time if some of the member companies 
have already made that move and are willing to share information about the host country’s 
market.  It will lower the fixed cost of entry in the host country by reducing the uncertainty risk, 
and it may also relax the capital constraints.10 
(e) Agency Cost 
     An extensive finance literature suggests that corporate diversification including FDI has both 
benefits and costs for shareholders.  With respect to FDI, the evidence is mixed as to whether 
international operations enhance firm value.  Some of the earlier literature demonstrated both on 
theoretical and empirical grounds that there is a positive valuation effect for multinational firms 
                                                 
8 See Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (2000) for the opposing views. 
 
9 It should be noted, however, that this practice may not be particularly profitable.  See Weinstein and 
  Yaheh (1995), for example, for the more recent evidence.  They argue that the keiretsu was not collusive  
  and that the individual firms remained competitive. 
 
10 See Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) for the capital constraint argument. 
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relative to purely domestic ones from having the option to operate internationally.11  On the other 
hand, the more recent literature finds evidence that points in the opposite direction.12 
     In a parallel development emphasizing agency cost, an explanation has been offered as to why 
firms diversify internationally even as it decreases the market valuation of the firm.  The agency 
cost hypothesis posits in the principal-agent context that diversification may benefit managers for 
various reasons including prestige that comes from managing an internationally diversified firm, 
managerial compensation that may be tied to firm size, and the perception that managers may 
become more indispensable on account of an overseas exposure.  Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997), 
for example, find empirical evidence that shows that the firm’s diversification is in fact related 
negatively to the extent of managerial equity ownership in the firm they manage.  The issue we 
investigate here is whether the likelihood of Japanese corporate decisions to make an FDI entry 
is related to managerial equity ownerships, the underlying question being whether Japanese firms 
behave similarly to the U.S. firms in this respect. 
(f) Firm Size and Years in Operation 
      FDI typically entails a substantial overhead investment at the entry point, requiring the firm 
to be of a sufficient size to be able to raise the necessary capital.  Most of the studies related to 
the firm size question confirms a positive association between firm size and FDI.  As noted by 
Caves (1993, p.289), an intriguing issue related to the size question is how small and medium-
sized Japanese subcontractors have undertaken FDI following their main contractor.  A 
tangential issue may be the length of time the firm has been in operation before deciding to 
extend its operations overseas.  In this context, the number of years elapsed since the firm’s 
                                                 
11 Errunza and Senbet (1981, 1984), Kim and Lyn (1986). 
 
12 See in particular Christophe (1997) and Denis, Denis and Yost (2002). 
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inception serves as a proxy for the firm’s cumulative experience and the human capital 
associated with that experience. 
(g) Exports and FDI 
     In the standard Heckscher-Ohlin trade model the substitutive relationship between trade and 
international factor movement is emphasized.  The substitutive relationship stems from the 
argument that in a world characterized by perfect competition and no transportation cost, 
international equalization of factor prices may be achieved at equilibrium either through trade 
with no international factor movement, or through factor movement with no trade.13  Concerning 
trade and foreign investment, however, empirical evidence that has been accumulated during the 
past thirty years suggests that the two are complements.14   
     An evolutionary model of trade and investment emphasizes that a firm first gains foothold in 
the host country’s market by exporting its product.  Only when the firm accumulates sufficient 
information through its export experience that profitable opportunities exist for investment, does 
the firm ratchet up its commitment to that market through FDI.  Does there in fact exist a 
statistically significant relationship between previous exports and the initial FDI decisions from 
the full-sample Japanese firms? 
 
3.  Statistical Model and the Data 
     We apply the partial maximum-likelihood hazard-rate estimation model to assess the 
likelihood of a firm to make the initial move to invest abroad.  Let hij(t) be the hazard rate at time 
                                                 
13 See Mundell (1968). 
 
14 See the extensive references cited in Drake and Caves (1992). 
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 t, representing the transition rate from the no-FDI state i to the FDI state j at time t.  The 
multivariate Cox proportional hazard model assumes that hij(t) is of the exponential form, 
 hij(t) = ho(t) exp[βX(t)] 
where ho(t) denotes the baseline hazard rate that is unspecified but is assumed to be identical for 
all states.  The column vector X contains time-varying covariates and β is the corresponding row 
vector of coefficients to be estimated.  The proportional hazard model specifies the probability of 
the firm’s initial  FDI to be the likelihood that the observed incidence of FDI should have 
occurred, given the hazards of all firms in the risk set.  This leads to the partial likelihood 
function to be maximized as follows: 
 L X
X
i
j
j R
i
n
ki( ) [ exp( )
exp( )
]β ββ
ε
= ∑∏=1  
where R is the risk set containing all censored firms as of the beginning of each calendar year t, 
and ki = 1 if a firm makes the FDI move during t, and ki = 0 otherwise.  Hence, information 
about past decisions enters into the calculation of the risk set, and this allows for the conditional   
probability estimation.15 
     The sample period is 1976-2000.  The sample contains 2,417 companies that were listed on 
the Japanese stock exchanges during this period.  Of these, 537 companies made the initial FDI 
move destined to the U.S., by far the largest destination country for Japanese firms.  The largest 
destination area in Asia was Taiwan, with the total of 309 companies making the initial move 
during this period.  For the comparative purpose, we estimate the model for each of these two 
economies separately.   
                                                 
15 The estimates obtained from this partial maximum-likelihood estimation are both consistent and  
    asymptotically normally distributed.  See Cox and Oakes (1984). 
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     The company-by-company data on FDI, taken from Toyo Keizai Shinposha’s Kaigai 
Sinshutsu Kigyo Soran (2001), are for green-field and acquisition (20% or higher equity 
acquisitions) investments.  There were relatively few firms that had invested in either country 
prior to 1976, causing no serious left-censoring problem in the estimation. 
     The measurement of explanatory variables used in the study and the respective data source 
follows.  The explanatory variables are entered into the estimation equation with the lag of one 
year. 
RD: Research and development spending divided by the firm’s total value added.   
Source: Nikkei NEEDS Zaimu Data (CD-ROM), 2000. 
CASH:  Total cash flow is evaluated as income after tax + depreciation allowances + provisions 
  for the future lump-sum retirement benefit payments – net increase in inventory  – 
  increase in accounts receivable + increase in accounts payable; the total cash flow is then 
  divided by the firm’s total assets to arrive at our CASH variable.  (We include dividends 
  in the cash flow on the ground that Japanese managers have a large discretion over the 
 dividend policy that is not subject to the pressure from stockholders to the extent that  
  the U.S. firms are.  Indeed, the dividend rates are low in Japan, and in reality, inclusion 
 or exclusion of dividends makes little difference to the statistical results that follow.)    
  Source: ibid. 
SIZE:  The relative size of the firm is measured as the firm’s total sales divided by the industry 
 total sales.  Source: ibid.   
YRS:  The number of years the firm was in operation since its inception.  The inception year is 
  from Toyo Keizai Shinposha, Kaisha shiki-ho (Quarterly Company Reports), No.3, 2001. 
KEI:  Horizontal keiretsu.  KEI = 0 if the firm did not belong to one of the six major groups 
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       (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuyo, Sanwa, and Dai-ichi).  For a member firm, KEI =  
  the proportion of the group members that are already operating in the host country.  
  Source: Toyo Keizai Shinposha, Kigyo keiretsu soran, 1994. 
RET:  Vertical keiretsu.  RET = 1 if the leading firm in the group was operating in the host 
country at the time the subcontracting firm made the initial FDI in that country. 
Source: ibid.  
OWN:  The proportion of the firm’s outstanding shares owned by the current managers.  Source:  
  Nikkei NEEDS Zaimu, op. cit. 
EXCH:  The real effective exchange rate of the Japanese yen.  Source: International Monetary 
  Fund, Financial Statistics, 2002. 
EXPO:   Exports from Japan to the host country, proxied by the proportions of the industry 
  total output exported to the host country.  Toyo Keizai’s company files do not contain 
  information on company exports.  We use this proxy on the assumption that the 
  Japanese firm’s business decision on the initial foreign investment is influenced by the 
  industry’s overall export orientation.  Source: Data on exports by industry are taken 
  from OECD’s International Trade by Commodity Statistics, various issues. 
INT:  Capital intensity defined by the firm’s tangible fixed assets divided by the number of 
  employees.  One abnormality of Japan’s FDI noted by Ray (1988) is that whereas the  
  investment pattern of Japanese firms tracks the Western countries’ pattern in key 
variables such as R&D and industry concentration, Japanese investments differ in that 
they are not capital-intensive.  We include this variable to see if that finding may hold 
relevance in the present study.  Source: Nikkei NEEDS Zaimu, op. cit. 
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4.  Statistical Results 
      The table presents the estimation results obtained for Japanese FDI in the U.S. and Taiwan, 
respectively.  In both cases, R&D, cash flow, the relative size, horizontal as well as vertical 
keiretsu, export orientation and the real exchange rate are found to have statistically significant 
influence on the likelihood of the initial FDI decisions with the “correct” sign.  The degree of 
consistency obtained in the statistical results between the two disparate economies of the U.S. 
and Taiwan is remarkable.  Appendix table 1 presents the correlation matrix for the explanatory 
variables, and it is evident that there is no serious multi-collinearity problem. 
     The agency cost hypothesis, on the other hand, does not hold up.  The result is statistically 
insignificant in both cases.  Therefore, there is little support to the notion that the FDI decisions 
are influenced by managerial ownerships of the firm’s equities.  To the extent that there is an 
empirical support for this hypothesis for U.S. firms, our findings indicate an indirect support to 
Aoki’s (1988) argument that in Japanese firms the interests of managers, stockholders and 
workers employed by the firm tend to merge as stakeholders in sharp contrast to U.S. firms. 
     Likewise, there is little statistical support for the length-of-time hypothesis.  On the other 
hand, there is some support for the factor-intensity argument.  The coefficients of the capital-
labor ratio are negative in both instances, and highly significant in the case of Taiwan.  This 
suggests that controlling for the other variables in the model, labor-intensive firms are more 
likely to invest than capital-intensive firms.  Surprising as this finding may initially seem, it does 
agree with the fact that a large portion of Japanese FDIs are by small and medium-sized business 
establishments.16  This tendency for labor intensity is particularly strong in the case of Taiwan, 
                                                 
16 In an earlier study of Japanese FDI in the U.S., Ozawa (1979) found that as much as one half of 
    Japan’s FDIs were by small and medium-sized firms. 
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where service-oriented and other labor-intensive industries are more prevalent in FDI activities.  
They are there, presumably to take advantage of cheaper wages prevailing in Taiwan. 
 
5.  Summary and Conclusions 
     We have brought together a host of financial and non-financial explanations to bear on the 
initial decisions made by Japanese firms to invest abroad.  Based on the full-sample data 
spanning the last quarter of the 20th century, a period in which the Japanese economy underwent 
a turbulent transformation from a high growth to a distinctly low growth period that included the 
bursting of a major speculative bubble, we find that it is remarkable that some of the financial/ 
macro variables do as well as they do in explaining the individual firms’ initial FDI entry 
decisions, whether these decisions pertain to investment into the U.S. or Taiwan.  Company-
specific variables such as R&D, liquidity as proxied by cash flow, the relative firm size, and 
memberships in keiretsu groups are also found to be quite relevant.  On the other hand, the 
agency cost hypothesis that has been offered to explain the behavior of U.S. firms is found to be 
largely irrelevant in addressing the Japanese FDI decisions.  The convergence of Japanese 
business practice and behavioral pattern to that of the western nations has been noted in many 
studies, but with respect to the FDI, that trend certainly is not across the board.   
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Table. Cox Regression for Initial Entry FDI Decisions, 1976-2000 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Covariates   U.S.-bound FDI      Taiwan-bound FDI     
  Coefficient Wald χ2(p-stat) Transition Rate Summary Coefficient Wald χ2(p-stat) Transition Rate Summary   
 
RD              0.304         179.2 (0.000)       1.35                     0.088          10.3 (0.001)      1.09 
CASH            0.117           6.6 (0.010)       1.12                     0.152           6.4 (0.011)      1.16 
SIZE             0.167          28.0 (0.000)       1.18                     0.179          26.6 (0.000)      1.19 
YRS            -0.021           0.2 (0.673)       0.97                     0.077           1.5 (0.220)      1.08 
KEI             2.052         101.0 (0.000)       7.78                     2.134          22.7 (0.000)      8.44 
RET             0.412          11.5 (0.001)       1.51                     0.480           6.9 (0.008)      1.61 
OWN           -0.060           1.3 (0.250)       0.94                     -0.001           0.0 (0.986)      0.99 
EXCH           -0.080         228.1 (0.000)       0.92                     -0.084         122.3 (0.000)      0.91 
EXPO           0.361         102.0 (0.000)       1.43                      0.197          15.3 (0.000)      1.21 
INT             -0.124           2.6 (0.106)       0.88                     -0.433           8.3 (0.004)      0.64 
 
-2logL                                                   9728.4                                                  5747.9 
Chi-square                                                 892.3                                                  257.9 
Degrees of freedom                                            10                                                     10 
Significance level                                         <0.0001                                                <0.0001 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Table 1. Correlation Matrix for the 10 Covariates 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
    Regression for the U.S.       Regression for Taiwan   __ 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)     (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10) 
(1) RD       1.00  -0.01   0.02   0.07   0.06  -0.01  -0.05  -0.03  0.05  -0.03     1.00   0.00  0.03   0.03   0.08   0.02  -0.04  -0.01   0.27  -0.03 
(2) CASH           1.00  -0.01  -0.03   -0.03   0.05   0.03  -0.01  0.02   0.04           1.00  -0.01   -0.03  -0.02   0.06   0.04   0.00   0.01   0.02 
(3) SIZE                  1.00   0.06   0.18  -0.02  -0.10  -0.02  -0.05   0.23                 1.00   0.10   0.25  -0.04   -0.12  -0.01  -0.06   0.24 
(4) YRS                         1.00   0.14  -0.02  -0.36  -0.04  0.04   0.02                       1.00   0.18   -0.02  -0.35  -0.03   0.09   0.03 
(5) KEI                                1.00   0.02  -0.11  -0.03  -0.01  0.06                              1.00   0.01  -0.12   0.01   0.02   0.13 
(6) RET                                      1.00  -0.15  -0.02  0.16   -0.01                                    1.00   -0.11  -0.01   0.09  -0.05 
(7) OWN                                           1.00   0.03  -0.08  -0.07                                           1.00   0.02  -0.11  -0.08 
(8) EXCH                                                 1.00  -0.02  0.01                                                 1.00  -0.01   0.01 
(9) EXPO                                                       1.00  -0.13                                                       1.00  -0.14 
(10) INT                                                              1.00                                                             1.00 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Table 2. Distribution of FDI Firms by Industry and Period 
                                                                                                                        
                                              For the U.S                                    For Taiwan                   
                               1976-80  81-85  86-90  91-95  96-2000  total    1976-80  81-85  86-90  91-95  96-2000  total 
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries        2      0      1      0      1      4         0      0      0      0      0      0 
Mining                               0      1      0      1      2      4         0      0      1      0      0      1 
Food and food products                2      6      7      6      4     25         0      0      9      4      1     14 
Textiles                             2      4      3      1      3     13         0      0      4      1      0      5 
Pulp and paper                       2      2      3      0      1      8         0      0      1      1      0      2 
Chemicals                          15     11     33     13     11     83         5      6     15      5      5     36 
Petroleum and coal products            0      2      2      0      0      4         1      0      1      0      2      4 
Rubber, glass, stones                  1      3     10      3      4     21         2      1     12      3      3     21 
Primary metals                       3      3     13      5      3     27         0      1      7      1      1     10 
Metal products                       4      2      5      2      3     16         2      0      3      0      3      8 
Machinery (non-electric)              12     17     19     10     11     69         2      5      11     11      7     36 
Electric machinery                   19     21     21      8      8     77         5      4     24      6     17     56 
Transportation equipment               5      9     27      1      5     47         7      5      6      2      4     24 
Precision machinery                   4      2      4      1      1     12         3      0      1      2      1      7 
Other manufacturing                   1      6      3      4      7     21         0      1      3      2      3      9 
Construction                         2      6     15      3      2     28         0      1      5      2      1      9 
Electricity, gas, water                  0      0      0      1      0      1         0      0      0      0      0      0 
Commerce                           4      6     13      7      9     39         3      4     17     16     14     54 
Real estate                           0      1      2      0      0      3         0      0      0      0      0      0 
Transportation and Communications      4      4     10      2      1     21         0      2      4      0      3      9 
Other services                        0      4      3      5      2     14         1      1      2      0      0      4 
Total                               82     110   194     73     78    537        31     31    126     56     65    309 
                                                                                                                       
